This article was originally writtern for UPI2205: Ethics and the Environment.
A society is not a monolithic entity of identical beings; it comprises of individuals with differing paradigms and what is valuable to one may not be so to another. Values, therefore, are relativistic; they depend on factors such as personal experiences, cultural contexts and political persuasions. The matrix of subjective qualities influencing values causes them to elude clear-cut definitions. Values can thus be described by many broad terms, inclusive of but not restricted to their utility, aesthetics, origins and essence. Despite this variability in characterizing values, there is a common basis for what one understands to be “valuable” – the esteemed subject must be fulfilling – or has the potential to fulfill – a certain good. The debate over Nature’s worth reflects these numerous, sometimes conflicting, views of what constitutes value. Is Nature valuable because of the material wealth it offers? Or does it have a value above and beyond tangible commodities? In this paper, two fundamentally distinct values – instrumental and intrinsic values – will be explored and their relative significance in Nature, evaluated.
A society is not a monolithic entity of identical beings; it comprises of individuals with differing paradigms and what is valuable to one may not be so to another. Values, therefore, are relativistic; they depend on factors such as personal experiences, cultural contexts and political persuasions. The matrix of subjective qualities influencing values causes them to elude clear-cut definitions. Values can thus be described by many broad terms, inclusive of but not restricted to their utility, aesthetics, origins and essence. Despite this variability in characterizing values, there is a common basis for what one understands to be “valuable” – the esteemed subject must be fulfilling – or has the potential to fulfill – a certain good. The debate over Nature’s worth reflects these numerous, sometimes conflicting, views of what constitutes value. Is Nature valuable because of the material wealth it offers? Or does it have a value above and beyond tangible commodities? In this paper, two fundamentally distinct values – instrumental and intrinsic values – will be explored and their relative significance in Nature, evaluated.
Progatoras,
a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, once said, “Man is the measure of all
things.” This quote reflects the anthropocentric tendency of an external valuer
to appraise a subject with reference to his needs and wants. The subject, by
itself, is not valuable; it is only valuable because it can be used to
accomplish a goal desired by the valuer and are correspondingly tagged as
having instrumental value. In Kantian diction, they are means to an end but not
an end in itself. Nature, with its diverse landscapes, animals and plants, can
contribute to numerous aspects of human welfare and consequently, has many
instrumental uses – it preserves a stockpile of genetic materials that may
prove useful in curing diseases or improving crop yields; it allows greater
understanding of the intricate biological systems; it purifies air by trapping
pollutants. Beyond instrumental uses associated with science, Nature can also
be mined for commodities such as precious metals and timber – which have
quantifiable economic value – or
harnessed as serene places for spiritual rejuvenation and recreational
activities. These various instrumental values of Nature – be they scientific,
economic or entertainment oriented – are extrinsic and can only be realized by
exploiting Nature’s utility. In these examples, Nature is only valuable because
of the substantial benefits it offers.
Because of
the significant instrumental value placed on Nature, it is exploited, modified
and even, extirpated. Reasons to safeguard the natural biosphere may be
attributed to an instrumentalist attitude – perhaps to preserve the environment
so that future and further utilization can occur. Godfrey-Smith, an influential
researcher on environmental ethics, suggests that if the worth of Nature is
believed to depend entirely on objective instrumental values, the destruction
of tracts of wilderness is justifiable when the satisfactions to be gained are substantial.
The reflexive discomfort that people feels at such a suggestion, he claims, is
due to the belief that such willful exploitation is morally reprehensible. This
anthropocentric paradigm of cost/benefit calculus places too much gravitas on
the thoughts and actions of man. It suggests that Nature has only instrumental
value and can be leveraged at convenience.
It ignores the intrinsic value
of Nature. This begs the question: what is intrinsic value and how does it
compare against instrumental value?
Subjects that
are valuable, in and of themselves, can be described as having intrinsic value.
They are cherished ends, not merely means to a valued end. They have objective
value independent of the valuations of valuer. And from the perspectives of
Biocentrism, Nature has this intrinsic value which eclipses its homocentric
instrumental values. Rolston, a prominent environmentalist, advocates that
intrinsic value is a real property of natural objects and processes, not
projected onto nature but discovered there:
“Consider a whooping crane defending its own life, or the
wild gardenias synthesizing glucose using photosynthesis, converting this to
starch, and storing energy. The animals, sometimes, will be subjects of their
own lives, and they too will have their preferences, simplified perhaps, but in
some respects more or less like our own. […] Such as living organism is, I
maintain, a being with a good of its own.”
The
intrinsic value that Nature has cannot be proved, observed or quantified with
ease. According to Rolston, nature’s intrinsic value is fully independent of
human valuing consciousness. Individual organisms, species and ecosystems have
values which they are both sources and loci of, and people are obliged to
respect them.
Because
values are subjective, thus relativistic, it is not straightforward to assign
values to natural environments. From dissimilar perspectives, it can be gauged
to have instrumental, intrinsic or even, inherent value. Take, for example, the
appreciation of Nature. The personal satisfaction gained from the collecting of
wild flowers is an instrumentalist attitude. However, those who advocate that
frail areas of blooming meadows be preserved even though that homocentric
benefits are not possible, ascribe Nature with intrinsic value. And if Nature
is to be appreciated for its beauty alone – but not economic or scientific
values – it may be considered to have inherent values that are not
instrumentally viable. Assigning value to Nature is not an objective endeavor;
depending on perspectives, Nature may be attributed with a variety of values.
Simplification into defined categories of values may create a superfluous
clarity, but does not actually lend understanding into Nature’s intricacies.
Therefore, one must be comfortable with the quandaries of valuing Nature and acknowledge
that it can be ascribed with multiple values at the same time.
Having
determined that values are relativistic and can co-exist in a single subject,
one can imbue Nature with both instrumental and intrinsic values. Harold N.
Lee, of Tulane University, reminds, “the object is not the value; it has the value;
and any object may have many values according to the various contextures which
it may be a part of.” The instrumental value of an object can only be realized
by exploiting its utility; this, however, may destroy the subject’s intrinsic
value. The converse is not true; a subject’s intrinsic value may be appreciated
without physically altering the subject. Suppose, for example, an appreciation
of tigers. It can be valuable instrumentally as Chinese medicine, fur coats or
taxidermised trophies; these manners of valuing tigers require destruction of
the tigers which, in essence, destroy their intrinsic value. However, if tigers
are treated as magnificent creatures with non-homocentric rights, they are
ascribed with intrinsic value independent of observers; their intrinsic value
can be appreciated, yet remain unharmed. From this analogy, it can be inferred
that Nature’s intrinsic value is far more transcendent and significant than its
instrumental value.
Nature, with
its pristine tracts of fauna and flora, require prudent stewardship. By
appreciating the nuances of various values ascribed to it, influential
stakeholders – including environmentalists, companies and governments – can
understand perspectives divergent from theirs and, with this awareness, cooperate
to promote a more harmonious relationship with Nature. Leopold, an ecologist
who campaigned for wilderness conservation, rationalizes:
“We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging
to us. When we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use
it with love and respect.”
The meaning
in Leopold’s statement can be extrapolated and viewed through the lenses of
Consequentialism; a central tenet of this philosophy implies that it does not
matter how societies view Nature – be it as a commodity to be managed or a
community to respect – as long as they work towards protection of their emerald
treasures. Through understanding that Nature has both instrumental and
intrinsic values, different campaigns for environmental conservation may be
crafted to appeal to divergent sensibilities. However, one must note that
intrinsic value is more “valuable” – more transcendent and worthy – than
instrumental value. Should there be a significant conflict in interests, the
former factor should take precedence.
Bibliography
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Godfrey-Smith, William. 1992. The
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Holmes, Rolston III. 1994. Value
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Cambridge, pg 13-30.
Leopold, Aldo. 1996. The
Land Ethic. A Sand County Almanac. Oxford University Press Inc, pg 217.
Missoni, John. St Francis,
Paul Taylor, and Franciscan Biocentrism. 30 August, 2011. <http://www.umweltethik.at/download.php?id=436>.
Nunes, Theodore. 1999. Rolston,
Lonergan, and the Intrinsic Value of Nature. The Journal of Religious Ethics,
Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pg 105-128
Partridge, Ernest. Environmental
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