This article is originally written for WP2201E From Humans To Posthumans.
Despite being
published simultaneously within an inaugural volume of a journal – Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology, Volume
1, Issue 1– Sarah Chan and John Harris (2007) do not agree with Michael
Selgelid (2007) on the merits of human enhancement, or its lack thereof. The
former pair argues for human enhancement while the latter has his reservations.
This juxtaposition of opinions – for and against genetic enhancement – highlights
the contentious nature of using biotechnology to alter the characteristics of
human beings. Proponents of human enhancement, including Chan and Harris, believe
in the alluring promises of science and consider that there is a “moral
imperative” to use such genetic enhancement technology for “the benefit of
future generations” (p. 3), be it to engineer viral immunity oraugment
intelligence. The problem, however, arises when critics discuss disadvantages
that may be associated with such potential benefits.Selgelid, in his An Argument against Arguments for
Enhancement, suggests that the drawbacks of such technology – such as
overall social inequality – may overshadow its expected benefits.
According to
Selgelid, such technology may not be as beneficial as it promises. Competition
for medical research resources between treatment and enhancement may widen
social inequality and “one should not act to benefit her own child irrespective
of costs entailed for other individuals and society as a whole” (p. 3). He tacitly
acknowledges that enhancement technology may benefit individuals and yet, warns
of its possible negative influences on social utility and equality; the
liberties and benefits of individuals should be subsumed under greater social
concerns. This warning contradicts Chan’s and Harris’s call to make use of “all
available knowledge and medical technology” to make one’s child “as healthy as
possible” (p. 3), an approach centred on an individual’s interests. There is
little doubt that safe and effective genetic manipulation – if it exists – may
benefit an individual, but questions remain on its wider implications for the
society.
Supporters and
detractors of human enhancement – Selgelid, Chan and Harris included – agree that
current genetic technology is dangerous and grasp of genetic modifications and
its effects, tenuous (p.2). However, they adopt different stances when
interpreting this observation. Selgelid posits that current genetic engineering
techniques are not safe and sardonically notes that they “do not just fall out
of the sky and into our labs” (p.3). His reluctance to support human
enhancement research contrasts with Chan’s and Harris’s advocacy for it. They
contend that medical know–how had always been risky in its infancy stages but
can be developed until potential benefits outweigh risks.
Selgelid, Chan
and Harris differ in their opinions of pursuing such expensive research too.
Selgelid suggests that such enhancement–oriented research and development
compete for resources which might otherwise be dedicated to the reduction of
suffering “by making the worst–off better off” (p. 3); his focus remains on the
greater good of the society. Chan and Harris, on the other hand,propose that
the technology can be developed on private funding. Private funding, they claim,
will remove “arguments founded on distributive justice” (p. 3), thereby
soothing concerns about unfair allocation of public resources for research. However,
they fail to explicate the link between private funding and “distributive
justice” – why would it be fairer if genetic enhancement research is funded
privately and would private funding paradoxically lead to other forms of social
inequality? Would it be such that only the wealthy can afford the technology
resulting from such expensive private –funded research? Their narrow definition
of justice – resting mainly on “distributive justice” – weakens their argument
for human enhancement, especially in view of Selgelid’s more encompassing and
thorough explanation of social equality.
The authors –
Chan, Harris and Selgelid – share common goals of furthering societal good and
humanity. Their contrasting stances on genetic enhancement stem from
disparities in their beliefs of what constitutes beneficial. Like Chan and
Harris, Selgelid believes that development and use of safe enhancement
technologies is unobjectionable; however, unlike them, his support comes with a
caveat: sweeping changes must be instituted globally before genetic enhancement
becomes socially acceptable (p. 4). Human enhancement is a dynamic and
controversial science spanning international borders. Frequently, there are
technological breakthroughs and correspondingly, quagmires of bioethical
concerns. Unlike Chan and Harris, one cannot – and should not – methodologically
rationalise away all opposition to bioenhancing. A more measured approach will
be to evaluate each technology on a “case by case basis” as suggested by
Selgelid. And despite Selgelid’s reservations, genetic technology continues to
march ahead before institutional changes could be implemented; there is no easy
way to halt the progress of scientific knowledge so that social reformations
may occur first and, as a corollary, human enhancements become “morally […]
acceptable” (p.4). No decisive judgement as to who – the proponents of human
enhancement or their opponents – makes the most convincing argument may be
passed for this ethical conundrum is more
complex than the sum of factors for and against human enhancement; the
interplay of these factors within particular geopolitical contexts must be
considered as well. The most apt course of action, for now, will be to let
societies respond to and evolve alongside science.
Bibliography:
Chan and Harris.(2007).
In Support of Human Enhancement.Studies in Ethics, Law and
Technology, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2007.
Selgelid.
(2007). An Argument against Arguments for Human Enhancement.Studies
in Ethics, Law and Technology, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2007.
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